




TEATTERIKORKEAKOULU
TEATERHÖGSKOLAN
THEATRE ACADEMY HELSINKI

Artistic Research in Action

Proceedings of CARPA 2
- Colloquium on Artistic
Research
in Performing Arts

EDITOR ANNETTE ARLANDER



Artistic Research in Action
Proceedings of CARPA 2
- Colloquium on Artistic Research
in Performing Arts

Artistic Research in Action
Proceedings of CARPA 2 - Colloquium on Artistic
Research in Performing Arts

THEATRE ACADEMY HELSINKI JANUARY 13TH TO 15TH
2011

THE PUBLICATION SERIES OF THE THEATRE
ACADEMY HELSINKI VOL 42.

PUBLISHER
Theatre Academy Helsinki

© THEATRE ACADEMY
Editor & writers

EDITOR
Annette Arlander

GRAPHIC DESIGN
Hahmo Design Oy

LAYOUT
Edita Prima / Annika Marjamäki

TYPOGRAPHY
Filosofia. © Zuzana Licko.

ISBN
978-952-9765-62-1

ISSN
0788-3385

Contents

<i>Preface</i> ANNETTE ARLANDER	7
<i>A Logic of Participles: Practice, Process, Knowing and Being or Textuality of Arrest – thinking done by Lynette Hunter for CARPA II January 2011</i> LYNETTE HUNTER	11
<i>I think I now know</i> RODDY HUNTER	23
<i>Breath as a Medium for Awareness and expression</i> LEENA ROUHIAINEN & HELKA-MARIA KINNUNEN	49
<i>Re(de)fining Action: From Yoga Postures to Physical Scores</i> MARIA KAPSALI	63
<i>Participation as Medium of Research</i> KJELL YNGVE PETERSEN & KARIN SONDERGAARD	75
<i>Artistic research on Lars Norén</i> PER ZETTERFALK	87
<i>Excerpts from the Artistic Process of Artificial Body Voices</i> ÅSA UNANDER-SCHARIN & CARL UNANDER-SCHARIN	95
<i>Perspectives in co-operation, Dance, Artistic Research and the Humanities</i> CECILIA ROOS & KATARINA ELAM & ANNA PETRONELLA FREDLUND	113
<i>Dialogues between art, medicine and research</i> KAISU KOSKI	119

<i>Spontaneous combustion</i>	127
STEFANIE SACHSENMAIER	

<i>Learning the Method of Teaching the Methods of Artistic Research</i>	135
CAMILLA DAMKJAER & MARIE-ANDRÉE ROBITAILLE	

<i>The invisible stage</i>	145
DAVIDE GIOVANZANA	

<i>Two rooms and a kitchen</i>	159
ELINA SALORANTA	

*A Logic of Participles: Practice, Process, Knowing
and Being or Textuality of Arrest – thinking done
by Lynette Hunter for CARPA II January 2011*

LYNETTE HUNTER

Practice as research as a political move to get more democratic access in aesthetics and art-making by explicitly articulating work from alongside, from outwith discourse, and making value for feelings and experiences that come from many diverse moments that are not said, not recognised in hegemonic systems.¹

Going public with art-making is a political act that performs politically.

Practice as research focuses on the moment that the practice as making or rehearsal [ie installation²] decides to go public, when the process of making is arrested into performance.³

Arrest: a moment of decision, of temporarily generating knowledge from processes of knowing, of articulating value that has not been said within discourse – a moment of research that is kept as a practice by releasing the arrest into the process of performance.

Once the made-art is in the public it enables a range of social, cultural, political action relevant to diverse groups within a democracy, but only if it is put back into process as performance. Only as process as performance can the not-said keep getting recognised within public systems of discourse. Once the not-said ceases to be part of an engaging performative process it becomes said, fits in, and is on the way to cliché and the banal, to being co-opted by a simulacrum that denies diversity, becoming enough.

This textuality, this rhetoric of process, here of fitting, in itself is political and ensures that the made-art is working politically rather than simply being Political.

Putting made-art into process as performance is the work of practice as research [ie constellation⁴]: arrest/ fitting/ until as enough.⁵

Art as research in action also has to feel when the process of performance is becoming enough, performing until the process stabilises, recognising that moment of until as enough when the not-said is said, and undoing that

moment of arrest that makes the saying possible in the face of knowing the presence of many other not-saids unrecognised by systemic democracy.⁶

These are also the work of the maker-as-critic, of the participant-maker, critique as practice.⁷

Art as research in action is only possible if the not-said in made-art is engaged through strategies of criticism as practice, another element of practice as research.⁸

Art as research in action needs a critical practice as research that keeps in process within the public sphere the performance of made-art from diverse groups.⁹

Art as research in action is also critical practice as research: both have a rhetoric of performativity.¹⁰

- 1 Practice as research is a political move to distinguish the art-maker from the Artist + respond to increasingly dis-unified aesthetics.ⁱ

The art-maker works alongside hegemonic systems to materialise the 'not said', but also: introduces the not-said into the system and into public action through practice as research: by choices = research = arrest = art as research in action.

Practice as research brings the not-said into political recognition at particular moments,ⁱⁱ with strategies that are not transferable but a stance that defines what it does not only as a political action but as a practice that performs politically.

Art-making as a sustained embodied knowing, being in the moment: a practiceⁱⁱⁱ draws from traditional knowledge, situated knowledge, enskilled knowledge, transmission often not recognised as valuable because it's in process.

Not all process is a practice.

Not all practice as making becomes articulated as practice as research.

Research as an articulation of knowing that is making / making that is knowing.

Practice as making is an aware and attentive rhetoric only articulated into public performance, into performativity, through practice as research: art-making as research in action.

- 2 Installation: iv practice as making – somewhat like-minded people, often with the same positionality, work collaboratively on making art, yet collaborative work means recognising the differences we make of others. Difference does not exist before we make it, and when we make it we change our self phenomenologically. There's a lot more to be said another time on practice as making.

- 3 Art-making as research in action engages makers and participants in a moment of arrest in the art-making that yields made-art into public performance.

Made-art engages with a participant-maker until engagement slows and ceases AND the participant-maker/critic has to undo the stasis by releasing the energy of a different need, another not said. ^v

Need: ^{vi} enters the alongside through recognition of what cannot be said – until as aporia.

Through awareness of life that cannot be lived without addressing that need, through luck and happenstance of being among others also trying to address that need.

Addressing the need by making difference.
- 4 Constellation: ^{vii} practice as research – central to installation is also the feeling of ‘when to stop’ the process, the political choice taken so that made-art enters public and sociocultural fitting/fit. Constellation happens at that moment of arrest, when art-making goes into the public and engages people in their own mode of changing things rather than simply being changed. Its political work:
 - introduces the not-said
 - arrests the dialectic to expose its contradictions to phenomenological experience / feeling
 - enables discussion across positionalities and positions
 - feels the moment of co-optation, when the not-said is no longer being addressed.
- 5 Practice of art-making as research – is a political action: it makes available to a wide public modes of knowing that are not recognised within representative political systems. ^{vii}

It has three elements (among others): arrest, fit and until ^{ix} all based on the work of the art-maker as a participant-maker and research as an art-making practice.

Arrest: when made art enters the public domain it may be 1) unrecognised, or 2) commodified, or 3) enter the process of fitting.

Fitting: generates 1) adrenalin rush of suddenness and suspense ‘will this fit?’ and 2) endorphins of fullness ‘ah yes it fits’. The movement between each are the process of fitting that change the body/mind of the participant. [often called ‘beauty’]

Until as enough: the recognition that the process of fitting has become fit or Art, is drifting toward cliché, toward the banal [not necessary but frequently happens]. The made-art sediments into enough, and on the way the participant-maker feels the pull of the not-said, of need, and works to undo the stasis of the banal / the fit of Art.
- 6 Practice as research not only makes the work of arrest, but also of fit, and of until at the moment of enough. This is the work of the participant-maker. It is also the

work of the critic, and critical work has to do what it tells, it has to perform the process of making and knowing – the textuality of practice as research. ^x

Art-making in public action : critical work as a situated textuality. ^{xi}

- 7 A lot of the work involved in keeping art-making as a practice occurs precisely around the way it enters culture and society and how we can return to it, to art-making before it becomes locked down into the banal. This work is the work of the participant-critic and the critical work of the art-maker who is engaged in research. Not all art-making is research. Art-making becomes research when, by arresting its process, it makes possible ways of knowing that others may take up and pursue. And not all critical work is practice as research. Critical work becomes practice only when it sustains the process of fitting, and releases the stasis of Art in the face of need, of something that has not been said. ^{xii}

- 8 The 'required' critical mediation for art-making as a mode of knowing is often inappropriate. Practice as research can offer more appropriate rhetoric for knowing within increasingly dis-unified aesthetics. ^{xiii}

Currently art-making is separate from the critical work of the participant-maker, because 'criticism' is usually end-directed and uses mediation that builds end products. ^{xiv}

But the participant-critic is an art-maker focusing on process, who can only feel the moments of arrest, fitting, fit and until, if they are woven into practice. ^{xv}

- 9 Without the critical work of art-making as knowing in the public world, ^{xvi} i.e. If we disseminate made-art into public awareness as knowledge, then we act as if
- the public is a coherent community rather than diverse
 - art-making is timeless universal knowledge rather than responsive to the moment
 - art-making is about identity rather than being/becoming
 - we make political art rather than making art politically.

- 10 Since critical dissemination is not recognised outside of end-directed media, practice as research needs different modes of critical dissemination. Needs its own journals with its own criteria for legitimation.

[Trauma of the humanities severance from the feeling/practice of reading

Crisis of the sciences reduction of experience from articulation] ^{xvii}

The critical work of practice as research can offer a different way of thinking that effects a difference between doing artwork politically and doing political artwork, by focusing on the rhetoric for the textuality of critical articulation. ^{xviii}

- i I would argue that the current wave of practice as research (I am aware of the range of 'practice-based research', 'research as practice', 'performance as research', 'art as research', that each have work to do. For the sake of this

presentation I'm pulling them all under 'practice as research' or PAR, because the philosophical claims made here have an impact on all of them.) has come about partly as a political move to distinguish the art-maker from the Artist. The Artist is someone tied to the strings of representation and discourse, the images of the powerful, the symbolic world of the subject. The art-maker is a person recognising their own non-autonomous labour, working on often unarticulated needs and values from worlds alongside the hegemonic, from positionalities. The art-maker sets aside the hegemonic, works alongside it. ^a Nevertheless, the art-maker also takes political action by introducing the things made, the made-art, into the systemic, moving from the *installation* of the rehearsal process of art-making to the *constellation* of public performance in whatever media. ^b The action adds to political rhetoric by containing within itself its own strategies of an undoing practice, doing to undo, as the practice of constellation recognises different needs and impels different installations.

- ii Practice as research is a political process that unties art-making from the universalist/relational aesthetics of discourse. ^c It has to be valued in the moment of its being present and generates a dis-unified aesthetics that looks as untidy as did the human body to seventeenth century physiologists – yet may have its own biochemical pathways, may operate on patterns of electrical synapse at a molecular, atomic and sub-atomic level, and evidences an ever-changing ecology with its own fractal mathematics, its own butterfly effect. What works for one group at one spatiotemporal moment, may not work for others or indeed for the group at another moment, even while sociohistorical contexts provide particular sets of strategies with a limiting effect on how a group works, generating apparent similarities. But its engaged stance is consistent.
- iii The 'practice' in practice as research recalls us to the work of art-making as a sustained, embodied knowing in any medium whatsoever. Practice is not 'just doing things' but something far more complex that calls on the various kinds of knowing about 'being in the moment' of making: from traditional knowledge, ^d to situated knowledge, ^e to enskilled knowledge, ^f to transmission. ^g Often the problem with practice is that its forms of mediation are not recognised as epistemologically valuable because they stress knowing rather than knowledge, process rather than product, for example dance or poetry. And a dance or a poem is not necessarily a practice either in its making or in its public action. That the potter makes a bowl and someone uses it does not mean it has a practice in the public world of action. Yet if the potter's knowing is articulated in the use of the bowl by participants, it becomes appreciated. The person who has the bowl engages with it so that it becomes part of the way they live and it becomes a practice for them. ^h A practice is an aware and attentive rhetoric that can only be articulated if the critical work is also a practice. The critical work has to do what it tells; it has to perform the process of making and knowing. It has a rhetorical stance, particularly an engaged stance, a performativity. ⁱ I would argue not only a practice of art-making but a practice of criticism that gives substance to both parts of the term practice as research.

- iv Art-making itself is changing conventional ways of thinking about art, not only introducing new art objects into culture but also introducing new ways of thinking about the processes involved in making art. In the alongside work of 'installation' that contributes to dis-unified aesthetics, the key element is the making of difference. Installation here carries the signifying weight of the activity of art-making in process, not merely the 'setting up' of made-art in a space. In installation somewhat like-minded people, often with the same positionality, work collaboratively on making art, yet collaborative work means recognising the differences we make of others. ^j Difference does not exist before we make it, and when we make it we change our self phenomenologically.

We experience the difference that we have made by a change in our body (body/mind). 'affect' isn't something that happens to us, but something we do to ourselves when we feel the 'until' of *différance*, the radical aporia of the not self and not said. The process of making difference, of affect, releases the energy of change. Feeling change in our self leads to the process of valuing the difference we have made and often to recognising our changed body as something that has not yet been said. ^k This entire process is wrapped up in art-making, and combines various ways of knowing with the crafts of various media. Central to installation is also the feeling of 'when to stop' the process, the political choice made so that made-art enters the public and sociocultural fit.

- v This political process of art-making as research in action gathers together at the moment of arrest the split between the producer and consumer, rendering it as an engagement among makers and participants, so that each gives more attention to the other. The art-maker and critic can be hosted in the same person. The maker *arrests* the process of rehearsal, of installation, to include other participants, enters the public world through performance and become a participant-maker. The participant-maker, or critic, engages in the public performance and is continuously alert to the moment of *until* when the process of engagement slows and ceases. It is the critic who then has to undo that stasis, not to leave the pieces all over the floor but to release the energy of a different need.
- vi Constellation happens at that moment of arrest, when art-making goes into the public and engages people in their own mode of changing things rather than simply being changed. ^l Yet in the public system the participants are highly diverse, ^a dis-unified sociocultural group that can engage in discussion across positions and positionalities. The art-maker's arrest introduces things not yet said into sociocultural fit so the possibility of this discussion is in itself a political process that rarely happens elsewhere. The arrest of constellation also arrests the dialectical contradictions of capitalist society. Benjamin suggested that a dialectical image arrests the tension of sociocultural contradiction in a performative moment ^m that lets the public feel the agony of remembering what they have to forget so they can exist within the exploitation of capitalism. And that this will, as Brecht wanted, change them and engender the need to change society. Constellation involves keeping the process of remembering going, keeping the discussion of the not yet said alive, but it also involves feeling when the discussion is slowing down, the language becoming cliché, the movement grinding to a

halt. This drift toward the made-art as being 'enough', lodged into fit as Art, has to be undone by the critic / art-maker as critic. Recognition of that moment of 'until', halted in enough, generates the activity of undoing the cliché of Art. Again the process is collaborative, and often deconstructive in the sense of probing assumptive logics that may have outlived their appropriateness.

In the rehearsal of art-making, installation performs the moment of an alternative, a not-said. Constellation, which involves a public audience, re-performs that moment as both contradiction and alternative while taking a step into discourse.

- vii Need is an energy release that enters the alongside world of art-makers through recognition of what cannot be said, through awareness of life that cannot be lived without addressing that need, and through the luck and happenstance of being among others also trying to address that need.
- viii The practice of art-making as research is a political action that makes available to a wide public modes of knowing that are not recognised within representative political systems. There are three elements to this research I'd like to touch on: arrest, fit and until. ⁿ All are concerned with how the art-maker articulates within public performance – and that articulation I am calling the work of art as research in action, i.e. the work of the participant-critic. This presentation argues that to sustain the process-based activity of art-making in the commodity-laden world of Art, critical work also needs to be an art practice. In other words just as art-making involves people in its alongside work in an engaged rhetoric, so should the critical work of art-making as research involve public participants.
- xi At the moment of arrest the made-art enters a public domain and may simply be unrecognised, or may slip immediately into commodity, but most often it goes through a process of *fitting* in. 'Fitting' is the experience of all participants in the public performance. Fitting generates the adrenalin rush of suddenness and suspense and the endorphins of fullness that change our body chemistry in the experience of beauty. Fitting is a process because only in the movement of that combination of 'will this fit?' and 'ah yes it fits' do the participants engage actively in the re-making of the systemic structures around them, however subtle those changes be. Yet the art-maker's critical work also involves strategies for recognising when the moment of arrest that generates that process of fitting, has gone. This often happens when other need is present and to be addressed. Again, by 'need' I'm indicating a way of life, or elements in it, that are central to people's lives, are not recognised as valuable in hegemonic systems and therefore not seen, heard, accepted, are repressed, even violently suppressed, at times leading to death. But whether people die or live, if they have need they cannot live the value that gives them a reason for living.
- x The work of a participant-maker is the work of the art-maker as critic, the critic with a practice. It is vital for art-making as research in action. We can make art in various ways to value different ways of life: with communities to value common ground, with collectives to value common aims, and in collaboration to work across different values and aims but with the same positionality or set toward

hegemonic systems. But to then make this public, to put it into sociocultural discourse that usually does not even recognise it, we have to have that critical skill to know when/where it's appropriate. One sign is that it continues to be both effective and affective, as long as it continues to generate disagreement.

- xi I'm using 'critical work' in a different way than is usual. It's here labouring to signify a larger and more political sense of art-making in action. As such, part of what I call critical work also involves strategies for when to stop the process of art-making so action can be taken. This is the moment of 'arrest'. Art-makers have to choose to arrest the moment of process if they want their made-art to enter the public world. That choice is a political action, taken to participate in sociocultural events. It's also a piece of research, critical work responding to particular events and stresses, often an informed feeling born of years of experience.
- xii A lot of the work involved in keeping art-making as a practice occurs precisely around the way it enters culture and society and how we can return to it to art-making before it becomes locked down into the banal. This work is the work of the critic and the critical work of the art-maker who is engaged in research. Not all art-making is research. Art-making becomes research when by arresting its process it makes possible knowledge that others may take up and pursue. And not all critical work is practice as research. Critical work becomes practice only when it releases the stasis of Art in the face of need, of something that has not been said. By the way, this does not exclude art of the modern period.
- xiii The contention of this presentation is that the 'required' discourse for art-making as a mode of knowing is often inappropriate, and that Art / Practice / Performance as research is at a disciplinary moment when it could be offering more appropriate mediations for knowing that would also respond to the increasingly dis-unified aesthetics of our diverse local-global interactions.
- xiv Currently we tend to separate the art-making from the critical dissemination. This is partly because critical dissemination is what legitimates practice as research and we go along with the requirement to produce, for example, an essay, because this critical dissemination is only recognised as research because it produces an 'end-product'. Currently we are in an inevitable drift toward the kind of practice that can produce an end-product if we do not change expectations. I believe practice as research is getting to the point where it is embedded enough into the institution that we can insist on differing ways of articulating. Pragmatically this will mean building peer-reviewed journals and publications in print/digital form that we accept as critically valid research. We are not going to change other people's publications, we need our own. If you pick up a mathematics journal, does it look valid? It looks alien. But people have to trust the discipline. And if we don't do it soon we'll get stuck in an institutionalised form of presentation that is not only not going to help practice as research but is also not going to help the work art-making as research in action does in a world of increasingly dis-unified aesthetics.
- xv The moment it moves into cultural fit, generating satisfaction and pleasure and a sense of validation, it's at that moment that it's open to cultural co-optation.

At times it retains the ability to keep generating disagreement, to keep fitting and releasing the adrenalin / endorphin rush of beauty. But all too often it drifts toward cliché, to enough. The work of the critic is to recognise not only the moment of arrest, but also when the co-optation is happening, when the need of the not-said is no longer being addressed, the moment of enough at the edge of stasis. To enable this critical work we have to work on critical dissemination as a practice. How do we turn critical practice into an embodied knowing responsive to the moment, an engaged rhetorical stance? *Politically it's vital because the process of arrest and fitting is a moment of critical attention, the work of research, that introduces the not-said, and in that arrest exposes the contradictions of a moment of dialectic to feeling, enables discussion across positionalities, prompts the recognition of co-optation, and generates the energy to respond to need – to make art that values life not said.*

- xvi This presentation has not been so concerned to talk about art-making and installation but about when the made-art and art-maker enter the public domain through arrest, when made-art turns into political action. The critical work of art-making as knowing in the public world has to sustain the process of engaging around made-art politically. If we continue to allow culturally approved genres to define what we do in the critical dissemination of art-making as knowing, then we act as if the people we address are a coherent community, and inclusive, i.e. not diverse and politically exclusionary
- as if the art-making is not knowing so much as knowledge (universal), i.e. not responsive to the moment
 - as if the art-making is about identity rather than being/becoming
 - as if we make political art rather than making art politically.
- xvii In the humanities as a disciplinary area there is considerable training in practice, for example the practice of reading. Yet there is little attempt to remain alert to this skill as an engaged practice: readers who are also critics usually have some grasp of a least an area of practice, but most readers do not take responsibility for their reading strategies, like most of us do not take responsibility for our choice of computer software. The humanities in general work with words and sometimes also with images as the primary material. They also use words as their form of mediation, and as long as those words are in a generically acceptable mode – e.g. the essay – then we accept them as 'knowledge'. Knowledge-validating genres are usually non-fictional because of the way society retains an association between knowledge and end-products, 'things that are the case'. Novels for example are interpretive and whether generic or so-called non-generic are held to be individually based, therefore not the case, not univocal, not collectivities and so on. Humanities' disciplines understand this, and have devised ways of seeking authority for interpretations in the form of footnotes, indices, bibliographies, appendices.

Literature prior to the eighteenth century is paid for according to the patron's feeling, and the critical revolution of Dryden, Pope, Coleridge, and others can be taken as an attempt to untie its value from those with the most power by other people moving into empowered positions. They developed the genre of the

essay as a revolutionary act much as those involved with the legitimization of the humanities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries turned to the history of language and those after them turned to linguistic statistics. Humanities' work is a creative practice of criticism that includes engagement with reading, with critical strategies and with written skills. Because it is a critical practice it is always changing, always in need of renewed legitimization for its claim that the practice of feeling from engaged reading is performed in its practice of criticism. People in the humanities both do and do not want to acknowledge this. That engaged feeling is usually the reason for study, yet the criticism that turns it into public action has become the institutional legitimization of that feeling, something that cannot enact the feeling itself. The humanities, as it becomes ever institutionalised within legitimating techniques that do not perform the practice of its criticism, is increasingly traumatised by what it has to accept to deny.

Oddly enough, I'd argue that the sciences are in a better place. There the question of how to legitimate the practice of criticism is completely masked because the laboratory medium of sustained embodied practice in the sciences does not use everyday language. Yet to be legitimated the science has to be written down. The scientific paper is however not science. The scientific paper intends to let anyone, anywhere, get access to the natural world in the way the experimenter did. The experiment is supposed to be not only replicable but also duplicatable, but anyone who has ever practised science knows that this rarely happens exactly. Most scientists recognise that the practice and the report are different, and do not value the report in the same way as the humanities value critical writing. Many humanities scholars are heard to bewail the fact that they have no time to 'read'. Yet if a scientist did not make the time to run a lab, they'd be out of a job. In effect, most scientists do not even think of the performance of the lab report. It's a second-order textuality, a code, a necessary structure not a material medium. And it's this that gives science its illusion of neutrality that implies not only that science is not political, but also that you cannot do science politically.

There is a growing crisis in science that brings it closer to issues in PAR, but as it were, from the opposite direction. PAR has a central problem with how to legitimate its practice yet also how to develop an attitude toward the practice of criticism that allows process and embodied knowing to be recognised as valuable, as political. Science on the other hand has a central problem in that its critical practices ARE legitimating but only if they stay the same. Many scientists realise the reductiveness of this situation. For example, there is a study – one among many – of a contemporary molecular biologist who came to understand the dynamics of a bacterium by following its dancing movement, and engaging in the dance. While his lab colleagues were quite prepared to accept this as a rationale, to disseminate the findings more widely he has to encapsulate them into a mathematical language that severs many of the experiential / phenomenological aspects of the knowing. At least science, like art-making, is often collaborative, as opposed to the humanities, which by virtue of the library - that collection of virtual bodies from the past - can pretend to work in isolation.

The generic exploration of articulation in PAR has sharpened the trauma of the humanities and the crisis in the sciences, and it retains the potential to offer different approaches to knowledge and knowing to all disciplinary fields. It is on the edge of an epistemological revolution that focuses on how the knowing happens, when it is needed as knowledge for political action, and when that moment is past. It offers a different way of thinking about critical practice that effects a difference between doing artwork politically and doing political artwork, by focusing on the textuality of critical articulation. I find it extraordinary that much recent work on performance studies for example doesn't look at criticism as a practice, especially given the practice base. The program I have developed at UC Davis has a specific remit to look also at the critical, research, dissemination part of practice as research, because it is here that art-making turns into public action.]

- xviii I realise that this is complex and unobtainable in a strict sense. But there is no reason why the critical component shouldn't be treated as a practice in itself, open to process within diverse populations and enabling of political discussion across positionalities. The art-making of critical work is in its infancy, but we can learn from the art-making we do a lot about how to contribute to the dis-unified aesthetics of the western world today.

The project may sound too large and possibly too difficult. But this is why there is the pragmatic: our own journals and our own ways of validating modes of knowing. History tells us for example of the introduction of visuals to statistics, of the introduction of symbols into mathematics. We need a place for the dancing biologist. If we cannot help him legitimate his knowledge within a wider public who else can? And if we cannot legitimate his, how can we value our own?

NOTES

- a I think here for example of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's understanding of 'beside' as a place where we live in, respond to and value everyday needs, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Duke UP, 2002), introduction; it's non-hierarchical version of Emmanuel Levinas' 'elsewhere', *Otherwise than Being: Beyond Essence*, trans A. Lingis (Pittsburg: Duquesne UP, 1998), 159-60, and the translator's introduction, xli-xlii.
- b L. Hunter, 'Installation and Constellation', in ed Bryan Reynolds, *Performance Studies: KeyWords, Concepts, and Theories* (New York: Palgrave, 2011).
- c The back to back dependence of universal and relativist is anxiously worried over by philosophers such as Lorraine Code, for example in chapter 8 of *Rhetorical Spaces in Gendered locations* (London: Routledge, 1995); 'relational aesthetics' is clearly trying to break the inextricable connection between the two, but so far has managed to theorise strategies that work within the assumptive logic of liberal nation states – work best for a slightly larger pool of relatively empowered people

but has no interest in what might happen if working outside that system of power; the 'relational' as 'interactive', theorised by Bakhtin, is closer to the rhetoric of situated knowledge.

- d Indigenous and aboriginal knowledge; also often familial knowledge.
- e Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective', *Feminist Studies* 14:3 (1988).
- f For example a range of craft knowledges, often tacitly learned, from dance to cooking to building software. See Alan Janik, 'Tacit knowledge, rule-following and learning' in eds B. Goranzon, B. and M. Florin, *Artificial intelligence, culture and language: On education and work* (London: Springer-Verlag, 1990).
- g Judy Halebsky, *Transformation, Transmission, Translation: Japanese Noh in West Coast arts practice* (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of California Davis, 2009).
- h A 'textuality', Lynette Hunter, *Critiques of Knowing* (London: Routledge, 1999) see chapters five and six.
- i This is a 'performativity' that does something different to Judith Butler's notion of performativity as identities constructed iteratively through complex citational practices (*Bodies that Matter: on the discursive limits of 'sex'* (London: Routledge, 1993)), and is closer to, but still different from, Diana Taylor's sense of the 'performativity' that mediates between hegemonic discourse and hegemonic agency (*The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Duke University Press: London, 2003)). For a short critique of the latter, see L. Hunter 'Performativity: making a noun out of an adjective', *On Performativity: Performance Research*, 13:2 (2008), 7.
- j Lynette Hunter, 'Globalisation and Installation: Ilya Noé's 'Deerwalk'', (submitted to *Art and the Public Sphere*, forthcoming 2012).
- k This is current research for me, forthcoming in a research project at the Institut für Theaterwissenschaft at the Freie Universität, Berlin, 2012.
- l Lynette Hunter, 'Engaging Politics: Keith Hennessy's radical devised dance theatre', in eds P. Lichtenfels, J. Rouse, *Performance, Politics and Activism: Scales of Production* (Palgrave Macmillan, for publication 2012).
- m Elin Diamond, *Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on feminism and theater* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.146-7.
- n Lynette Hunter, *Disunified Aesthetics* (McGill-Queens Press, forthcoming 2012).
- p Della Pollock, 'Performative Writing' in eds Peggy Phelan and Jill Lane, *The Ends of Performance* (New York, New York University Press, 1998).