- as when commonplace becomes cliché, character becomes melodramatic type, parable or saying becomes platitude, allegorical enigma becomes emblem, and narrative type becomes narrative stereotype. Repetition in the printed medium raises the whole question of the corporate or consensual approach and response to self-evident status whether one views it as a comforting, reinforcing ideological constraint, as merely social commonplace, or as potentially distorting manipulative requirement. But it also raises or foregrounds the strategies which operate by subverting the concept of ‘matching’ repetition, such as parody, paradox, allegory and so on.

The new technology also brought it problems to do with the increasing speed of communication brought about partly by its mechanical reproduction of near-identical items and partly by changing economic and transportation systems that increase the ease of financial and geographical access to books. A medieval topos or common ground may have been expected to have a fairly long ‘shelf life’ in terms of its social relevance, which may be why the limitations of a static reasoning theory were not more immediately apparent. But where does one have a valid source of social commonality in less stable economic societies? One place is clearly in the new genres of books of manners and etiquette, books on food, cooking, household management and husbandry. There are the many seventeenth-century commonplace books which also indicate a need for these grounds, but one which was very local and possibly with short-lived private relevance. Clearly much commonality was derived from education, religion and what remained of the oral tradition, which may be why folkloric and biblical topoi became more common, because they depended on more stable traditions than education by and in formal rhetoric. And the novel’s broaching of the family structure as a basic social unit became one of the most long-lived sets of topics available. Yet, just like the rhetorical topos, all of these can quickly become nostalgic, no longer concerned with involvement in the consensus but with maintaining the corporate.

Discussion from common grounds is based on persuasion to opinion and the reaching of consensus. The problem with consensus is that while its terms are initially agreed to by ‘consenting adults’ who are aware of the rules of the linguistic and social context, that consensus is all too often allowed to maintain its ‘agreement’ beyond the relevant context. At heart this is the problem with recent twentieth-century argumentation: that it claims validity on the basis of its designed, patterned structures to which rhetor and audience agree, without recognising that once established these agreements merge into a corporate structure which gives only the illusion of a conscious recognition of design. That merger often happens by default, but the structure is also open to manipulation toward just such delusion.

4. PROBE AND SOMNAMBULIST: THE PROS AND CONS OF THE TOPICS

Many post-Renaissance attempts to solve the problem of the topics as stasis theory in written literature, to which the above can give only a very limited set of notes, run into their own similar methodological problem, because this problem is, as most, rhetorical. Few of the attempts offer broad reminders of the possibility of combining the topos of person and act with those of category and structure, although many address unique parts of the relationship. In other words they do not provide an adequate description of either reasoning or representation or communication, because they neglect the necessary combination of forms of analogy with social context. The inadequacy is tied up in the changes of economic system and the development of individual and state, which needed a completely recast set of topics: category, structure, person and act, adequate to the changing political formation and historical set.

But recasting is in itself misleading. No reasoning by analogy in social context within history can be valid unless it provides for a maintaining of the consensual basis of its underlying agreements. What Marshall McLuhan and Wilfred Watson address in From Cliché to Archetype is directed to just this rhetorical problem. Indeed the writing of the book itself appears to have raised exactly this issue. Watson, in ‘The Place Marie Dialogues’, speaks of his own desire to maintain ‘dialogue’ on the material while McLuhan’s was to get it ‘written’ by dictating it, which somehow stopped the dialogue. Despite the unfortunate phrasing of these cross-purposes, which tends to set them among misleading oral/ graphic issues, Watson is describing in miniature what happens in consensus/corporate agreement. The moment something is decided upon, here by being written down, the partners to it may want to change it in the light of new developments. If they do
not, they then consciously or unconsciously compromise themselves in its corporate stance.

This said, the structuring of the book invites considerable dialogue and generates much contradiction quite overtly. For example, its formal construction is based on an alphabetic ordering by titles of chapters so that one reaches the 'Table of Contents' under 'T' near the end of the book. There is no clear organisation; for example several letters within the alphabet have more than one entry, some letters have none. But neither is the structure remotely haphazard. The 'Introduction', which appears of course half-way through the book at the letter 'T' rather than standing self-sufficient as introductions at the start of a book usually do, includes developments of phrases and ideas from the preceding chapters A to H. In effect, the introduction comes at just the right place, precisely at the moment when one has struggled with difficulty to some understanding and would like it underwritten. Needless to say this does not happen. The introduction proposes directions significantly different from those the reader had anticipated.

In McLuhan's terms, From Cliché to Archetype (FCA) expands on three areas which he lays out in his earlier writing which could be summarised in this way: In The Mechanical Bride it is noted that governing states do not nourish recurrent symbols if they are alien to the dominant impulse. The Gutenberg Galaxy suggests that the figures of traditional rhetoric are the postures of an individual mind; and posits archetypes as the postures of the collective mind. Understanding Media goes into the development of technology in the creation of a corporate state that now dominates particularly the western world. McLuhan here moves on to the question of corporate rhetoric in an electronic culture/technology. This word 'technology' is a central term for McLuhan, with its related doublet conscious/unconscious; and he goes on to define cliché as the extension of one physiological sense, which is a form of technology. McLuhan, if nothing else, perceives a firmly materialist basis to communication that always looks to politics, culture and historical event, and discusses communication in terms of the technology and theories of perception and knowledge which maintain a complicity with those events.

In Watson's terms, FCA is not about the extension of one sense. It focuses on the multiplicity of senses and coming to terms with the postmodern eccentricity of senses, but with some concept of the non-homogeneity of consciousness (p. 201). The cliché is not fossil fuel (p. 200), packed sensual potential as McLuhan would have it, but an act of consciousness. The book itself, however, closely relates sensual extension to consciousness albeit very much in McLuhanian vocabulary. An extended sense eventually becomes a technology, and technologies in turn create psychological and physiological environments. The environments then affect the ability of the senses to develop and the direction they may take. The conscious is the recognition of the development of a sense or senses; the unconscious is the domain of repressed senses. But the unconscious only becomes important if a single technology extends so far over all parts of our life that the senses it excludes are completely denied. In this way consciousness and technology are united in their recognition and development of one particular sense. FCA explores the suggestion that clichés are technologies in that they extend one sense response over others, and that archetype is the extension of many senses. What is more important about the work is its argument that neither cliché nor archetype is inherently helpful or limiting; nor by analogy, as I shall try to discuss, is technology. Hence the social implementation of cliché/archetype and the technological is constructed, not 'natural'. FCA looks for the tools of that implementation.

The argument of the book starts from a position at the root of rhetorical studies, that no figure is inherently positive or negative. On the one hand we have the cliché probe, which is the positive extension of one sense; and on the other we have the somnambulist cliché which is the total excluding extension of one sense. Just so, there is the archetype as probe, which is the positive extension of many senses at one time, what McLuhan calls in a precise definition the multimedia, as well as the somnambulist archetype which is the total extension of many senses. Rather than attempt finer definition here, I shall try to provide examples from one of the book's main topical fields: printing history. But it should be noted that although McLuhan himself often uses print as an example because for him print is the informing technology of the modern period, here noting that the word 'cliché' is from the French cliquer, meaning to make type fonts repetitively, I provide print examples in the spirit of analogy and topic rather than for any inherent qualities print itself may express.

In printing, the cliché probe or the extension of one sense into a specific technology, extends the visual sense emphasised by the
From Cliché to Archetype

production of books. The somnambulist cliché becomes the total and dominating extension of print which induces an anaesthetic response, creating numbing environments of deep culture which are parallel to deep technology, unseen and pervasive. This domination is effected by the development of movable type which extended book technology so far that the effects were sweeping and by the nineteenth century totally exclusive of other communication technologies. Here is an example of McLuhan’s claim that technology is often more effectively powerful than epistemology. He argues that the theories of knowledge and perception underlying book culture were constant from the ninth or tenth centuries right through to the nineteenth, yet the introduction of new printing methods during the Renaissance was able to revolutionise the extent of the visual bias of the underlying epistemology. 4

For McLuhan the extension of any technology is responsible for defining identity within ideology, and he argues that print technology is one of the main drives toward the definition of the individual in terms of the private versus the state.9 Several commentators have expanded on this, but what McLuhan goes on to suggest is that when you try to destroy the defining technology you get violence, because the destruction is perceived as an attack on identity. This is one reason that technologies are so difficult to change. However, they do eventually get thrown out, and usually just at the point that they become ‘total’ and hence expose their limitations. In other words just at the point that they claim to be able to explain or describe everything their deficiencies become obvious.

When the discussion in FCA moves toward archetype, a precise definition of the term emerges, firmly separating it from any relation with the a priori Jungian archetype. The archetype as probe retrieves clichés from the past, it retrieves recurrent patterns and technologies, or in other words repressed sensual emphases, but within a present, different environment. The old clichés bring with them aspects of the senses repressed by the present, which often lead to new technologies as well as foregrounding the limitations of current ideology. Indeed Watson expands on archetype in ‘The Place Marie Dialogues’, saying that it is first ‘a technology operating in the shadow of another technology’, then ‘a cliché functioning in the shadow of a dominant cliché’ and finally ‘a cliché which is the content of another cliché’ (p. 204). Here an example from print technology might be the retrieval of ‘mythic’ logic at the end of the nineteenth century. The increasing use of rational and analytical argumentation fundamentally linked to the visual facility books provide for going over and rereading discursive material, along with the introduction of Ramist rhetorical technique intimately connected with a growing book culture, has been well documented. So, indeed, has the related development of private scientific research and the experimental method. It is argued that the nineteenth-century loss of confidence in the print-governed use of a rational analytical logic, which encouraged the idea that truth was a ‘matching’ activity of exact and absolute identity, retrieved older clichés of, for example, the dream or the myth, where truth becomes an activity of ‘making’ or ‘doing’ concentrating on relations. Such a retrieval generates extensions of other senses, and the archetype as probe is important because it rediscovers other sensual awarenesses: this is McLuhan’s description of the activity of multimedia.

Through exaggeration the archetype becomes somnambulist, the media become pervasive: in print technology you get what McLuhan calls innocuous ‘content’ or nostalgic archetypalising. Elsewhere McLuhan suggests that writing is responsible for the invention of ‘content’. But it would be clearer to say that any mode of representation that claims to present the world by means of matching identity, invents ‘content’ because it claims to give something that is exactly what is in the world, something that can be divorced from the medium in which it represents. However, the pervasiveness of exactly reproducible print technology combined with writing has allowed this view of ‘matching’ representation to become widespread. Any representation that sets up ostensibly exact codes that are immediately recognised and accepted, destroys the possibility of varied sensual awarenesses, and in this the pervasive media of nostalgic archetypalising fuse in effect with extensive cliché. The total extension of one sense or the total extension of many both end by dominating the environment, both become ‘unseen’.

The resulting relationship between cliché and archetype is highly complex. The archetype probe retrieving old clichés not only discovers a whole range of sensual awarenesses, but also generates new clichés or emphasised senses. These new cliché probes in turn may become vastly powerful and extensive tech-
nologies that generate dominant archetypes. The movement is not necessarily circular, nor is it necessarily stepwise, nor linear. It is part of the movement of history and the construction of ideology. While cliché and archetype exist as stances to do with one sense or many respectively, and each functioning as either probe or somnambulist, the relations between them are thoroughly material.

The contradictions which emerge from Watson's account of the writing of FCA concerning the divergent definitions of cliché as sensual extension and cliché as an act of consciousness, are quite apparent in the book yet not dichotomous. They stimulate more 'dialogue' by acting as 'probes' in their own right. What the discussion is concerned with is an exploration not of consciousness but of the means to consciousness and the implications that they have for an understanding of an 'unconsciousness'. A probe functions by providing a tentative common ground for communication which, as it gains a consensus, moves imperceptibly into corporate somnambulism unless arrested by another probe.

The movement describes a possible way in which topical grounds can be set within social context and generate a perceived validity. But since the actual context changes while the initial setting for validity remains the same, the agreed upon grounds can be used to maintain an illusion of the continued existence, the continued actuality and functioning of the original context. The movement from cliché to archetype indicates how these grounds can attain stasis by becoming dominant, repressing potential means of questioning them or other archetypes. In so doing they move from consensus to corporate, from practical to pragmatic. Whether their corporate activity is factual, completely repressing alternative grounds, or designed and theoretically leaving open the possibility of alternatives, it effectively maintains the initial technologies and their surrounding ideological and economic systems.

This account of the movement between cliché and archetype and some of the complexities of the context-bound/context-free ground or topic, comments directly upon the argumentative problem of consensus and the corporate which are to do with the activity of constructing history. The central issue is the parallel that emerges between somnambulist cliché or archetype, and corporate agreement: none of these seek to examine the basis for their reasoning, their grounds remain obscured and indeed they develop techniques for encouraging this hiding.

5. RESTORING SOCIAL CONTEXT TO THE MASS/MULTIMEDIA

While no topics are inherently opening or limiting, probe or somnambulist, a topic takes on different activities within different historical contexts. And FCA moves on to suggest a series of figures which have become very important in modern literature because in the contemporary western ideologies they tend to act as probes, upsetting the somnambulist corporate grounds and seeking a new consensus. They do not directly parallel the ancient topics because the social context, and McLuhan and Watson stress in particular the context of communicative media, has changed so radically. Nor is there here any attempt to be comprehensive. But there is a thorough study of a set of activities which combine the topics of person, act, category and structure in a manner appropriate to keep the mass communication media alert and stimulated.

Central to the activity of these figures is the description that the book gives of competing theories of representation, here called 'matching' and 'making'. The loaded visual bias already noted in several seventeenth-century discourses, along with the claim by the responsible prose of science and philosophy to present the world 'as is', generate a theory of representation and communication as a 'matching'-up of visual symbols to actuality. The stasis that this requires underwrites the somnambulist mode. FCA carefully links 'matching' to the Puritan rejection of pagan gods which is encouraged by a print medium that promises to retrieve the purity of Christianity by establishing verifiable proofs, and which transforms the 'physical and psychological torment' of Dante's Hell into Milton's 'Apollonian museums of pagan antiquity and of the arts and senses' (p. 121). A parallel is made between the replacement of Plato by Euclidean rational space,51 and the relegation of the 'whole human past' to Milton's Hell by a 'seventeenth-century mechanist' (p. 130). The writing here specifically acknowledges, albeit in contentious terms, the rejection of analogical reasoning in favour of the rational and of 'matching', during the seventeenth century.

Against this McLuhan and Watson set 'making', which is explicitly an analogical activity in a probing mode, and they look at myth, dream, paradox, allegory, puns, jokes, hendiadys and several other activities which depend upon doubling and repetition to be effective. The doubling is described as running present
clichés alongside past archetypes, present privileged or dominant modes alongside other marginal or minority senses(desires/technologies. To a certain extent new loci are discussed as the writing directs us to the power of the banal, the ‘vulgar’, the popular, advertising clichés, cartoons and fashion icons. Finally, considerable attention is paid to genre as the location for devices to construct the positions of speaker and audience, writer and reader, and to the attendant devices of mask and dialect as further refinements of genre.

The doubling and repetitive activities of the analogical structures that they propose take a number of different forms. Myth, for example, is a fundamental doubling activity of modern writing which establishes ‘parallels without connectives’ (p. 141). FCA continually returns to the mythic form of the ‘city’, often citing Joyce’s Ulysses or Eliot’s Wasteland as writings which disturb the civic unity of the twentieth-century city within the state, by setting it against mythic cities of other times like Troy or Renaissance London which are based on different assumptions, thereby exposing the grounds of civic unity to often uncomfortable assessment. Dream has a similar activity but works in a more personal manner. Rather than retrieving past archetypes for social organisation, it foregrounds repressed sensual awareness, lost clichés that may often threaten and certainly create tension when emerging into the environment of currently privileged senses.

Two structures, paradox and parody, indicate some of the range possible to doubling or repetition. Paradox is a central device because its repetition reinforces the possibility for duplicity (p. 161) which is so important within the context of written rhetoric (p. 99). This sense of ‘counterfeit’ or ‘duplicity’ is a far more stimulating activity for writing than easy dismissal into ‘fictionalising’, with all its connotations of ‘mere storytelling’. Paradox is defined as ‘a major form of cliché probe dependent upon an encyclopedic retrieval of older clichés for its exercise’ (p. 162) that acts like a metaphor which probes by analogy into other historically different forms.

In contrast parody is ‘one road running beside another road’ (p. 170). Parody is chosen to comment on the problem with analogy that it may be active probe yet may also simply manipulate parallels to reinforce current clichés. The distinction is drawn between parody in science being either a scale model based on visual realism or an active, clearly limited and therefore challeng-

ing, analogue. Paradox is discussed in terms of the distinction between the paradox of analogy, which is held to be probing and deeply rooted in the community (p. 158), and paradox as mere puzzle-solving. This distinction, however, evades the problem that the forms present an indissoluble knot of contradiction, and is quite separate from the latter which could be characterised by the movement of one cliché probe into an extensive and ‘self-evident’ solution. Wherever someone claims ‘community’ one must look for the hidden interest, and this evasion becomes highly significant when we pass on the concept of genre.

The evasion is also apparent in the description of other devices and should be noted. But despite its presence the book offers much of interest on other analogy-making structures. Jokes, for example, are described as ‘stabs or probes into the cultural matrix’ (p. 132), indicating areas of social irritation in the response they provoke. The ‘funny man’ is the only one socially licensed to air grievances. As such he acts doubly as a voice for minority ‘insight’ (p. 133), and as the contact through which the state reaches the private individuals of the public. One of the examples given is of ‘Irish jokes’ which operate to release, for a powerless populace, the tension over Ireland; but this ignores the other even more marginalised position of the Irish themselves.

Surprisingly another device which is studied is hendiadys, which brings together of seemingly unrelated words in phrases which achieve uncanny stability such as ‘song and dance’ or ‘sweetness and light’ which, the writers suggest, presents compressed myth just as oxymoron is a small or compressed paradox (p. 109). Insight into the activity of hendiadys is illuminated by the comment on the banality of popular loci that they are ‘charged with the accumulations of energy and perception’ of the community, which can be released if placed in an encounter with different but similarly charged loci. An immediate example of such an encounter might be of the child who describes someone as ‘coming home with a cliché on his face’ and, when asked why, says that the dictionary describes cliché as ‘a worn-out expression’. But an example of hendiadys acting in this way is the illustration from Shakespeare, ‘to lie in cold obstruction and to rot’, which the writers note derives from the proximity in Cooper’s Thesaurus Lingual Romance et Britannicae, 1584, ‘c.f. obstrudo, to rot: to drive a thing deep and hide it in the ground’ and obstruo, ‘to shut: to stop up, to make up a building; to hide
another's prospect' (p. 10). They suggest that it may well be a 'repetition and variation of components of sound . . . a counter-point in the vowels or a marked cadence or harmony' that welds the doublets together and charges them with energy. Any attempt to discuss the implications of aural and rhythmic elements is extremely difficult, and the writers in FCA go some way to establishing a vocabulary for doing so, expanding on it in several places but particularly in their discussion of pun as a 'world of acoustic space', in terms of resonance, syncopation and symbolism.\(^{53}\)

The doubling activity of all these devices is gathered together in the stance of allegory which is here presented as possibly a 'multigenre' because it has the ability to probe many different archetypes simultaneously, and they give the example of Kafka whose writing probes both the totalitarian and the anti-totalitarian reader (p. 96). In this they indicate an awareness of the need for context. Devices on their own will never guarantee challenge of the corporate or insistence on the consensual. But certain devices within specific contexts can go a long way toward providing this activity. This historical specificity is noted in the double-edged action of utopia.\(^{44}\) On the one hand utopia is today often seen as a form of nostalgic archetypalising dependent on the pervasiveness or dominance of the archetype to convince one of the validity of its proposed world. The rules or grounds for the operation of the proposed world have to accord as closely as possible with the grounds of the society in which the utopia is read. The more closely they accord, the more acceptable the proposed alternative appears. On the other hand, Thomas More's *Utopia* fully exploits the etymology of utopia as both 'good place' and 'nowhere' in its choice of the epiphany for genre. The epiphany is a structure which establishes a 'continuous parallel between two worlds, one past and one present' (p. 168) in a manner similar to myth. However, the loss of recognition of this generic form of epiphany limits its helpfulness to the modern reader.\(^{55}\) The awareness of historical specificity and social context is intimately part of the stance of allegory: something hinted at by the writers when they note that 'most works of art have quasi-allegorical quality' (p. 96).

More explicitly, they develop their concern with context and what may be called the related topoi of person and act in their discussion of genre, mask and dialect. The most extensive section in the book is on genre and focusses precisely on Quintilian's *decorum*, 'the propriety of different forms of dress and expression in different circumstances' (p. 93). Here, and in the later section on *mimesis*, it is clear that the writers are addressing themselves specifically to the 'modern' and laying in a terminology for the 'post-modern'. They are concerned with identifying the *mimesis* of the post-Renaissance with 'matching', bodied forth in literature primarily through 'realistic' devices and genres such as the novel. In contrast to this they develop their comments on the genres which take *mimesis* as 'making' - the detective novel, the Western, the soap opera - describing these as genres which present an uneasy commitment both to the private individual of the state and to the collective that is emerging through the expansion of communication systems in the twentieth century. Indeed they note that in this world 'the importance of the group-creating characteristics of genre can hardly be overestimated' (p. 104), and that the *mask* acts as a kind of 'group face' just as dialect acts as group speech.

The book becomes intensely problematic and contradictory at this point since the illustrated devices all move toward disruption of the corporate, while the discussion of genre and decorum focuses on how we can survive in a world which constantly scraps, retrieves and probes, in the unremitting environment of electronic communication – how we can achieve some form of workable consensus to allow us to act socially. There are no solutions offered, yet the book begins and concludes with theatrical events: the Theatre of the Absurd at the start and the Happening at the end which provide terse indications of possible strategies. The Theatre of the Absurd is a classically modern form, devoted to using the banal, the cliché, the impasse, in order to probe the senses which society has repressed, to release the unconscious.

In the final section of the Happening, it is noted that these 'strategies for stimulating' (p. 196) become differently absurd in a world of 'rapid innovation . . . [where] the input of the new cliches exceeds the power of human response or adaptation' (p. 196). The result is the alienation of the post-modern in which the activity/role of the artist is to help us to adapt. In contrast to a retrieval of many cliches, the Happening 'is a repetition of an environment as a means of offering some control to the perceiver', in which the actors are the audience and must 'put on the corporate social power of one's culture' (p. 204). But the sense in which 'corporate' is here used is highly misleading since it lies
within the context of current North American politics, where the corporate is described as constant probing.

This description fails to take into account that this is a human construction of archetype as probe just as much as the state was a human construction of archetype as somnambulist. Alongside the supposedly positive reading of corporate probe as multiconsciousness, the laudatory face of pluralism, lies the corporate probe as ‘doublethink’: the ability to be conscious of repressing many alternatives while simultaneously denying their existence. For the constructed probe will always be limited to the number of technologies of which one is aware. The hope of retrieving all unconscious archetypes into simultaneous probe is not only pragmatically impossible but implies that there is a finite number of them to retrieve. The pluralist reading underpins American liberal culturalism and the doublethink reading hints at totalitarianism. Both evade the implications of economic and biological determinism. The Place Marie Dialogues’ actually pose the possibility of a ‘natural’, pre-technological body, explicitly yearning after the body as something whole and somehow trustworthy, untouched by construction. And of course the vision of corporate probe is based on everyone having equal access to storage/retrieval mechanisms, something which patently has not happened and cannot happen.

However, in FCA, McLuhan and Watson do address the alternatives to rational, analytical reasoning. They describe a number of analogy-making structures and loci appropriate to the ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’, and they develop a concept of genre as the location for the construction of topics of person and act. On the way they provide much of considerable interest concerning the post-Renaissance emergence of analogous reasoning and, as with earlier rhetoricians, they emphasise its necessary position in social context if it is to become neither essentialist nor arbitrary. That their work has been extended primarily by those who call themselves Marxists rather than by the deconstructionist inheritors of the post-modern may itself be a probe into the corporate politics of contemporary North American institutions which the writers in their own writing so desperately reveal/conceal.

Notes
1. Plato. *Phaedrus and the Seventh and Eighth letters* (Penguin, 1971), see p. 68 where Socrates presents the difference between good and bad speechwriting as one between seeking the truth and seeking approval or opinion.
3. *Phaedrus*, as above, is based on placing the philosopher in parallel with the true lover and his madness.
5. M. Leff, 'The topics of argumentative invention in Latin rhetorical theory from Cicero to Boethius', *Rhetorica*, 1, 1 (Spring, 1983).
13. I would like to thank Lesley Johnson for her discussions on this topic.
14. See E. Stump, as above, p. 256, for another view of this tendency.
17. During the sixteenth century the theatre became an important location for the challenge to accepted authorities. Space restricts my own discussion of it here, but see Paul Hammond’s opening comments in *The play of quotation and commonplace in King Lear* in this collection.
18. L. Jardine, as above, p. 152.
21. K. Meierhoff, 'Melanchthon Lecteur de' Agricola: Rhétorique et analyse textuelle', Göttingen, 1989; see also M. Cogan, as above; and M. Leff, as above 1978, p. 19.
23. Grafton and Jardine propose an interesting theory of the ‘bourgeoisification’ of rhetoric through Ramus, as above.


27. See Grafton and Jardine, p. 199.


29. W. Howell, as above, pp. 353-4.

30. Aristotle, as above, p. 277.


36. L. Hunter, as above, 1990.

37. I am grateful to Lesley Johnson for her comments on this field.


44. M. McLuhan, as above 1962, p. 252.

45. M. McLuhan, as above 1962, pp. 56 and 236.

46. M. McLuhan, as above 1951, pp. 75 and 87.

47. See in particular W. Ong, as above 1971.


50. See FCA, pp. 132-50; and M. McLuhan, as above 1962, p. 45.

51. This parallel is a contradiction, for elsewhere in FCA Plato is equated with the rational.

52. These comments are particularly pertinent in the light of P. de Man’s (and others’) elaborations on ‘deceit’ as the informing motive of post-Renaissance literature.

53. See W. Redfern, Puns (Oxford, 1984), for a stimulating account of puns and useful comments on the rebus or visual pun.


55. See A. Fowler, Kinds of Literature (Oxford, 1981), and the comments of the ‘lost’ genre of the ‘sylvan’.

56. See L. Hunter, as above 1990.

57. For example F. Jameson’s development of the social, as above 1979.